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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 2 
A FINANCE POLICY FOR SCOTLAND 
by Sheila C Dow, Department of Economics 
University of Stirling 
At the national level, monetary policy is regarded as an 
important tool for government influence on the economy; 
this importance has been highlighted in the debate over 
the future of UK monetary policy in a European 
monetary union. The relevant (interrelated) questions are: 
how would the UK economy fare with monetary policy 
applied on a uniform basis across Europe, and with the 
full integration of national capital markets, and what 
would be the relative costs and benefits for the UK of a 
single European currency? 
These questions are equally valid with respect to the 
Scottish economy, as part of a single currency area, with 
a significant degree of financial integration, and with 
uniform UK monetary policy. It is particularly apposite 
at this time to consider these questions again for 
Scotland. Institutional change is proceeding apace 
within the UK financial sector, both with respect to the 
organisation and behaviour of the private sector, and also 
with respect to the policy environment within which it 
operates. In addition, the devolution debate raises 
questions about the desirability of policy-making at the 
Scottish level with respect to the financial sector, either 
within the present constitutional environment, or within 
the range of alternative environments under consideration. 
The first question to address is whether there is any 
justification for a separate policy with respect to the 
financial sector in Scotland. A common currency, 
freedom of entry for financial institutions and free capital 
flows would create what is often referred to as a 'level 
playing field' for financial institutions. This level 
playing field, it can be argued, means equal competitive 
conditions which produce the most efficient allocation of 
borrowing and lending. In particular, an economy which 
does not generate enough saving to finance investment 
can borrow from elsewhere, either from outside 
institutions, or through the books of a UK wide branch 
banking system. Similarly, an economy without 
sufficient productive outlets for saving can lend outside 
the economy, earning a competitive return. The more 
integrated are financial systems, it is argued, the more 
freely and efficiently can this process operate. 
The case for deliberately differentiating policy for the 
financial sector in Scotland need not involve rejecting the 
above argument. It is possible that UK monetary policy 
has differential regional impacts which need to be taken 
into account. Some sectors are more responsive to 
interest rate changes than others; a region whose 
economy is particularly dependent on such sectors will be 
particularly badly hit by a rise in national interest rates. 
More generally, if tight monetary policy is designed to 
dampen demand which is too high only in certain 
regions, an unnecessary degree of unemployment will be 
created in other regions. This argument has been made 
recently with respect to tight UK monetary policy aimed 
at curing the over-heating of the South-East, but which 
unnecessarily dampened already weak demand elsewhere. 
While at one time Scottish banks could be treated 
differently in terms of national monetary policy in the 
form of credit controls, the scope for differentir', ->olicy 
in this sense is now virtually eliminated by the fact that 
the banking sector is so highly integrated within the UK. 
This integration almost certainly rules out any possibility 
of differential interest rates, since it would be too difficult 
to police categorisation of deposits and advances 
according to region. 
Nevertheless it may be argued that national monetary 
policy may also have differential effects across regions 
because there is still some regional segmentation of 
financial markets. Thus, if local households and 
businesses in a region are dependent on a local banking 
system which is limited in its credit-creating capacity, 
tight monetary policy may have a disproportionately 
constraining effect on credit creation in the region. 
Given the high degree of integration of banks in Scotland 
with the UK (and international) banking system, this 
argument must in itself have limited force. To the 
extent that it does have force, however, whether the cure 
lies in accelerating financial integration or not depends on 
whether or not one accepts the argument about the 
inevitably beneficial effects of financial integration in the 
first place. 
If this argument is rejected, then there is a case for policy 
to preserve and\or promote segmentation of financial 
markets. It may be, as has been suggested in the past 
with respect to Scotland, that regionally-specific banks 
can provide better access to credit than banks 
headquartered elsewhere, because of long-established 
client relationships and local knowledge, even though the 
reserve base may be relatively constrained. (The banks 
do not provide the information necessary for assessing 
whether this is currently the case.) But if capital flows 
were freed up by further integration of financial markets, 
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outflows from Scotland could be encouraged even more 
than inflows. Then the reserves constraint on local banks 
would be increased, limiting credit creation for small 
local firms. 
With an integrated financial sector, however, local banks 
can borrow reserves. Credit creation is in fact more 
constrained now by capital base than reserves; local 
banks are then limited by the market's valuation of their 
assets. But if local banks concentrate their lending on 
the local economy, they are dependent on the market's 
valuation of the region's assets. In the same way, 
allocation of credit to Scottish firms by banks 
headquartered elsewhere will depend on a valuation of 
assets. To consider the process of credit creation in 
Scotland, therefore, we need to consider the state of the 
economy more generally, the state of confidence in it 
among decision-makers within Scotland and elsewhere, 
the resulting financial behaviour of all sectors, and what 
all this implies for the valuation of Scottish assets. 
The Scottish economy is weaker than the rest of the UK 
taken as a whole: lower real income per capita, higher 
unemployment, relative reliance on natural resources, for 
which markets are relatively volatile, a declining heavy 
industry sector, and relatively high outside ownership of 
industry. These are common characteristics of peripheral 
economies; though Scotland has the unusual 
characteristic of a relatively strong financial sector. Long 
experience of economic vulnerability would imply the 
type of financial behaviour which could be categorised 
as defensive: relative unwillingness to spend on consumer 
goods and capital goods, unwillingness to borrow rather 
than use existing savings, and unwillingness to put saving 
into relatively risky assets. Evidence that Scottish 
households and firms do indeed behave in this way is 
presented in a recent report (Dow, 1991a) 
The outcome of this kind of defensive behaviour is 
relatively low consumer spending, low investment and a 
preference for safe assets, which in general would be 
supplied outside the region. This reinforces the 
economy's relative weakness, holding down actual and 
expected asset prices, making it more difficult for those 
firms which wish to do so to acquire credit; what is 
regarded as credit-worthy ultimately depends on a 
subjective evaluation of assets. 
The picture being presented here, elaborated in another 
recent report (Dow, 1991b), is not simply one of 
problems with credit supply. It is one of financial and 
real behaviour in all sectors of the Scottish economy 
which seems to make sense for each household, firm, or 
bank in isolation, but which does not make sense at the 
economy level; as a result individual households, firms 
and banks may find that their defensive behaviour is 
insufficient to protect diem. Just as defensive behaviour 
can create a vicious circle of economic weakness, so 
expansive financial behaviour (within reason) can create 
a virtuous circle of economic expansion. Because there is 
a difference between what seems to make sense at the 
individual level and what actually makes sense when the 
economy-level view is taken, there is a strong case for 
policy action to break the circle. 
The first policy recommendation that follows from this 
analysis is made at the fundamental level: more and 
better information needs to be collected and analysed in 
order for a more fully-informed view to be taken of the 
nature of financial behaviour in Scotland. The major 
gap refers to the behaviour of financial institutions in 
Scotland. Most institutions operate UK-wide (or in some 
cases, world-wide), and data are not made available on 
the Scottish-non-Scottish breakdown of their assets and 
liabilities. There are some indications that financial 
institutions in Scotland act defensively, but there is not 
enough information to say more. More information is 
also required on the financial behaviour of Scottish firms; 
to what extent is there a credit gap, and to what extent 
are firms hanging back from putting forward loan 
applications, or from share issues? 
The second fundamental requirement is that a public 
body be charged with responsibility for forming a view 
of financial behaviour in Scotland and its consequences. 
The remit would be broader than that adopted by 
Scottish Finacial Enterprise; promoting the health of the 
financial sector itself is important in its own right, but 
does not address the economy-wide issues raised here. 
Similarly, Scottish Enterprise is concerned among other 
things with credit gaps and other requirements of 
business, but this does not address the full 
interdependencies of financial and real economic 
behaviour throughout the economy. The policy issues, 
and the associated data requirements, require a view to be 
taken by the body with responsibility for all aspects of 
the Scottish economy and their interdependencies: the 
Scottish Office under current constitutional arrangements, 
or an Assembly or Parliament under the new 
constitutional arrangements being contemplated. 
The ideal policy package from any perspective would 
depend very much on what was revealed by further 
investigation and new data sources. In the meantime, 
thought can be given to some possibilities. In particular, 
much can be learned from the policies introduced by 
regions in other countries. Here some ideas are drawn 
from the policies of some of the provincial governments 
in Canada (introduced incidentally by administrations 
which spanned the political spectrum). 
Some provinces (most particularly Quebec, but also 
British Columbia) have introduced measures to promote 
their financial sectors as international financial centres. 
The aim is partly to boost the sector for its own sake, but 
partly also to generate the critical mass of financial 
activity required to sustain a local financial centre in 
order to meet local financial needs. Since the incentive 
for international business to be conducted in Montreal 
and Vancouver rests on tax incentives, there would have 
to be a consensus on differential tax treament within the 
UK for such a policy to be implemented here. 
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A wider range of provinces have introduced stock savings 
plans. These involve credits against provincial income 
tax for residents who purchase stocks in local companies. 
The conditions attached to the credits are designed to 
ensure that the companies are genuinely local. Again 
this policy requires some Scottish control over income 
taxation. The policy is attractive for a range of reasons: 
it attracts finance to local companies, easing any credit 
gap; it encourages local firms to go public; and it 
provides a local outlet for local savings, if financial 
behaviour is defensive, which limits the damage to the 
local economy. 
There are additional measures which could be considered 
for harnessing local financial resources. The public 
sector could issue savings instruments specifically to 
finance development projects. If borrowing powers were 
part of the devolution package, the Assembly or 
Parliament itself could borrow in the same way as the 
Canadian provinces. They use a variety of instruments, 
including savings offices, non-negotiable savings bonds 
for residents and negotiable bonds issued on the 
international market Borrowing powers would be an 
appropriate adjunct to taxing powers; the economic 
growth generated by the use of borrowed funds would 
generate the tax revenue to fund the debt. Further, some 
Canadian provinces have Heritage Funds to gamer natural 
resource revenues in good years, to support general 
revenues in bad years, and to promote a long-term 
restructuring of the economy. 
As far as Scotland is concerned, if there is an economic 
case for devolution, then it must be anticipated that mere 
is untapped growth potential; if additional expenditure 
allows that potential to be achieved, the debt can be 
funded. In the meantime, whether borrowing or not, an 
Assembly or Parliament would at any time have 
considerable financial resources at its disposal. The City 
of Burlington, Vermont could provide inspiration as to 
the disposal of these balances. The City has introduced 
a linked deposits scheme whereby it deposits its balances 
only with banks which meet certain criteria as to the 
allocation of credit. All banks are required to provide 
information on the breakdown of credit allocation. 
These are simply some possibilities for a finance policy 
for Scotland which have been tried elsewhere. The ideal 
policy package for Scotland would be tailored to the 
particular requirements of Scotland. Before such a 
package could sensibly be designed, there is a great need 
for public debate on the subject. But that debate in turn 
needs to be informed. As a priority, it is up to 
companies to indicate their financial needs, and for banks 
and other financial institutions to provide better 
information on their activities in Scotland. But, 
ultimately, it is up to the Scottish Office to provide the 
leadership in ensuring that these information requirements 
are met. 
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